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Electronic Service of Process: A Practical and Affordable Option
Service of Process: a Primer
It is not enough that courts have the ability to exercise control over persons and property.i
The Supreme Court has held that at a minimum, the due process requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment includes notice of the proceedings.ii Thus before a State can legitimately exercise
such power its jurisdiction must be perfected by effectuated service of process.iii Service of
process is the formal presentation of instruments that initiate legal action against a person or
property.iv It is the method by which a defendant is formally notified that an action against her is
pending and marks the beginning of a defendant’s involvement.v In most instances, service must
be in person by delivery of the complaint and summons.vi The noted advantage is that personal
service better guarantees actual notice of the pendency of a legal action.vii
Since the middle of the 20th century, service of process – and personal jurisdiction – have
evolved to accommodate practical obstacles of personal service arising from the increased
mobility of individuals and the rise of interstate commerce by permitting more indirect methods
of service, substituted and constructive service.viii The Court announced the standard in Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. that notice to the parties must be “reasonably calculated
under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections.”ix With this standard, the Court authorized notice
by publication and held that such a method satisfied due process when the relevant parties’
addresses were unknown and could not be discovered with due diligence.x
Since Mullane, courts have not only authorized alternative methods of service but have
held that such approaches satisfy due process where more traditional methods -- personal,
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published, and registered mail – are inadequate.xi Requirements for service of process have been
relaxed concurrently with a trend towards increasing mobility.xii

Changing Times: Harnessing Modern Day Technological Developments
Today, domestic service of process is for the most part governed by Rule 4 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), and to some extent, state law. When the FRCP were first
drafted in 1938, the drafters were understandably constructed the rules within the technologic
confines of the time; the typewriter and telephone comprised the forefront of office technological
development.xiii Modern computing technology and the Internet had yet to be invented.xiv Since
then, technology has entirely revolutionized communication, providing an easy way to exchange
information across vast distances. Email has become an almost inescapable method of modern
communication whereas business-to-business mail has dropped by substantially.xv An
amendment to the FRCP would reflect the technologically advanced times we currently live in
while upholding and maintaining the core purposes of traditional service of process.

Policy Reasons to Adopt Electronic Service of Process
With the expansion of the Internet, electronic service of process offers many advantages
both to individual litigants and to society as a whole. Electronic communication is time-efficient
– one click and information transmits – and with the notoriously long court proceedings in the
United States,xvi increasing efficiency could offset more difficult to address sources of
inefficiency like a backlog of cases. Electronic communication is also inexpensive. That is not to
say that the more traditional alternative of service by mail is cost-prohibitive, but unlike
traditional post, email requires only the initial cost of acquiring the equipment/hardware
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necessary to access the Internet; each email costs little, if anything.xvii There is no need for spent
man-hours in locating, traveling, serving to effectuate manual delivery.
In looking at the benefits to electronic service against other permissible methods, it is
comparably reliable. For example, mail service is open to serious flaws; the Postal Service relies
on people to transport physical documents and is subject to human error. This could result in lost
mail or incorrect deliveries. Similarly, service on the domicile is premised on the assumption that
an occupant of the domicile will behave accordingly by passing on process to the defendant. By
contrast, electronic service is not subject to human error in the same way. It relies on programed/
automated infrastructure that is becoming more reliable by the day. Electronic service of process
is also targeted. An email account is exclusive to the individual and duplicative social media
profiles could be addressed with emerging cybersquatting laws that defend against imposters and
related trademark issues. In comparison to publication, electronic service of process is more
likely to apprise the defendant of legal proceedings against him as publication is not targeted
towards an individual but broadcasted out to a community (like a newspaper). If publication
remains a constitutionally valid method for rendering service, electronic service of process
should pass constitutional muster.
Electronic communication also has the benefit of creating a record. Courts have
acknowledged that unlike traditional forms of communication, email systems capture a complete
record of the communication, preserving the exact text.xviii The storage of information regarding
transmission and receipt – which may include the date and time the messages were sent and
received and an acknowledgment that the email was retrieved – is a tool that can assist in
checking for actual notice and furthers Due Process interests. And where paper documents can
be shredded, email records are more difficult alter. In that way, electronic communication makes
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it easier to demonstrate actual notice. For example, if a user logs into Facebook to view her
profile and sees that process has been posted to her “wall,” deletion of the process-post would
compellingly indicate actual service. From Service of Process origins, process for in rem legal
proceedings concerning property was once served by “posting” the relevant documents to the
property itself— for land, postings were made a the four corners of the property; for ships,
service was effectuated by posting to a ship’s mast.xix A public “post” had an added benefit: such
service could potentially effectuate notice in two different ways: the defendant herself could
personally be notified or the defendant could be notified by a third-party.xx
Public “posting” on a social media platform functions in a similar way to effectuate
notice, perhaps even more effectively. For example, a key user-function of Facebook is that it
provides the ability to post photos, messages, documents, and Internet links on other users’ walls.
A post on an individual’s verified Facebook account could potentially reach the defendant
personally, or could reach those in the defendant’s vicinity who might then be apt to put the
defendant on notice. Compared to a physical post that may or may not be seen by relevant third
parties that might assist in effectuating notice, a public electronic “post” would be more likely to
reach the defendant through third parties should the defendant not personally be notified, as
social media spheres are individualized platforms in which a person cultivates a personal society.

Electronic Service of Process in Practice under the FRCP: International Service of Process
As mentioned previously, domestic service of process is governed by FRCP 4(e) and
provides no other means of accomplishing proper service outside of paper-based service of
process—but notably, under the FRCP electronic service of process is permitted in the context of
“Serving an Individual in a Foreign Country” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3). xxi
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FRCP 4(f)(3) allows service of process “by other means not prohibited by international
agreement, as the court orders” which permits a court the discretion to determine a method of
service within constitutional bounds.
Through the cases that arose from FRCP 4(e), federal courts have articulated advantages
of using electronic communications starting as far back as 1980.xxii In New England Merchants
National Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Co., a number of American plaintiffs
sought to serve process on Iranian defendants, but were stymied by a diplomatic breakdown
between the U.S. and Iran.xxiii The district court ordered service of process via telex, a now
obsolete fax-based form of electronic communication.xxiv The court noted that the use of
electronic service of process had “little or no precedent” in the jurisprudence, but nonetheless
authorized electronic service of process on the reasoning that the world had changed such that
written communications were no longer conducted solely by mail.xxv Expressively, the court
stated that “no longer must process be mailed to a defendant’s door when he can receive
complete notice at an electronic terminal inside his very office, even when the door is steel and
bolted shut.”xxvi
In 2000, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia also
authorized international service of process via email.xxvii In that case a trustee of International
Telemedia Associates, Inc. (Broadfoot), sought damages for mismanagement by Diaz, a former
director of the company.xxviii Despite best efforts, the trustee was unable locate Diaz to effectuate
service.xxix The trustee had only a number and an email address, so the court held that Rule
4(f)(3) authorized service to the defendant’s email address.xxx The court noted the flexibility of
Rule 4(f)(3) and its wide scope that permits the “utilization of modern communication
technologies to effectuate service when warranted by the facts.”xxxi

5

In 2002, the Ninth Circuit further expanded the tools of international service in Rio
Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlinkxxxii by authorizing electronic service via email on
an international defendant. In that case, two online-based casino companies operated under the
name “Rio.”xxxiii The plaintiff, a Las Vegas casino, had several registered trademarks associated
with the name, and sought to sue the defendant – a Costa Rican entity – for infringement, but
was unable to locate Rio International.xxxiv The Ninth circuit affirmed the trial court’s order
sanctioning email service and delineated three considerations: (1) prior attempts by the plaintiff
to effectuate service by traditional methods, (2) the defendant’s use of email for communication,
and (3) evasion of service by the defendant. The court noted that email service was warranted
because Rio International had created a business model where it was exclusively reachable by
email.xxxv
Social networking websites, such as Facebook, have provided other alternative methods
to consider. In Mpafe v. Mpafe, a U.S. family court in Minnesota in 2011 authorized a plaintiff to
serve process through email, Facebook, or any other social networking site.xxxvi There, the court
notably favored social media options over service of process by publication for the plaintiff who
sought to effect divorce on the reasoning that “it [would be] unlikely that the Respondent would
ever see.”xxxvii The court also asserted “the traditional way to get service by publication is
antiquated and is prohibitively expensive” and that “technology provides a cheaper and hopefully
more effective way.”xxxviii

Addressing Perceived Limitations of Electronic Service of Process
A perceived limitation that the Ninth Circuit noted in Rio was the lack of confirmation
that a defendant has received the message.xxxix The court was concerned that there could be no

6

way to verify that an electronic message has been opened.xl However, since Rio, online
communication has evolved. Today, a notification to the sender displaying that the message has
been “read” by the recipient is widely incorporated and reliably available across a number of
platforms, such as Facebook, Android and Imessage.xli In regards to email, free online services
are available that automatically track receipt of an email and are able to show whether the
intended target has opened the email.xlii Application of such software could be mandated by a
court that seeks to allow electronic service of process.
The criticism that may hold the most weight is that the adoption of electronic service of
process removes formality from the procedure—formality that may give weight to the documents
and the legal proceedings in the eyes of the defendant. This reason may have been the reason
that, in the process of amending service of process to incorporate mail service, the Rules were
instead amended to create the option of waiver; Rule 4(d) allows defendants to avoid the cost of
personal service by waiving service, the process of which uses mail to send and return the
judicial documents.xliii The rule provides that a plaintiff can notify the defendant of the
commencement of the action and request the defendant waive formal service. But on its face, it is
illogical that with waiver, the FRCP allows defendants who are actually notified of the
commencement of legal proceedings through receipt of a waiver notification to refuse waiver for
personal service. In short, why do the Federal Rules allow a defendant who has notice of
proceedings against her to demand formal service? The answer is best attributed to the
compliance pull that arises from the increased legitimacy that comes from the formality in
personal service of process.
The adoption of electronic service of process would supersede the function of waiver and
eliminate the use of the provision—but it is nonetheless the better choice in light of its numerous
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benefits and the future capacity to build electronically based legitimizing characteristics that can
exert a similar compliance pull; there is an open-ended future potential for the creation of
electronically based legitimizing features that can exert a compliance pull.

Adoption Proposal
It might seem service of process would best be streamlined such that domestic and
international service of process procedure were the same. However, it is difficult to capture
domestic and international concerns within the same language because FRCP 4(f)(3), which
allows service of process “by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court
orders,” displays the intention to make international accommodations of the laws of other
nations—a comity concern that is not relevant in domestic service of process.
We could amend the FRCP to incorporate electronic service of process domestically by
looking to federal rules in other nations. A modification of the Federal Rules would have an
immediate impact on all federal courts, and thus, effectuate new procedure in the entire nation.
The benefit of a blanket application of the service amendments to the federal system is that it
could perhaps spur state legislatures to follow suit with amendments to their own civil procedure
rules. The disadvantage, of course, is that implementation of electronic service of process in all
federal courts through the FRCP rather than on a state-by-state basis results in forfeiture of the
“laboratory of the states” benefit that could come from gradual implementation. Of course, I
would espouse adoption on both the state and federal level, but this proposal addresses an
amendment to the FRCP as a starting template.
One source that provides a potential model is Australia. The United States could cherrypick Australia’s approach to first craft a template-type rule and then adapt it with any other
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considerations in mind. Rule 10.24 of the Federal Rules of Australia governs substituted service
of process in Australia.xliv The Rule provides that “If it is not practicable to serve a document on
a person in a way required by these Rules, a party may apply to the Court . . . for an order . . .
substituting another method of service.”xlv Such a flexible rule provides that where it is
impractical, the court may use its discretion to execute an order for a suitable substituted
service.xlvi An example of its broad application: in 2008, in Child Support Registrar Applicant v.
Leigh, the Federal Magistrates Court in Australia pursuant to Rule 10.24 ordered that the plaintiff
may notify the defendant of the pendency of proceedings against him through text message. xlvii
As a rough proposal, Federal Rule 4(e) could be amended with several provisions to address
domestic electronic service of process.
The amendment could include a safeguard requirement that the online address is actually
used by the defendant, which would provide that the plaintiff must make an affirmative showing
that the defendant has accessed the electronic profile/platform/communication device previously
within a certain number of days. This construction would import the “reasonably calculated”
flexible standard articulated in Mullanexlviii and would give a court the discretion to interpret
whether a given technological communication mechanism in a given case is a constitutional
method for service of process. Additionally, this safeguard along with adopting a model similar
to Australia’s would be consistent with the requirement within Mullane that the means employed
to effect service be one in which a person desiring to contact the defendant would use.xlix

Conclusion
In 2012, a judge in the District Court of the Southern District of New York denied a
request to allow service via Facebook.l In denying the request, the judge described the request as
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“unorthodox” and found that Chase bank did not provide “a degree of certainty” about both the
Facebook profile and the email address that was attached to it that would ensure that the
defendant would receive and read the process.li Instead, the judge allowed service of process by
publication in newspapers. It is ironic that the judge adhered to a method of service that was first
deemed permissible by Mullane; in Mullane the court trail-blazed in setting a new standard by
expanding the scope of traditional methods of service. I would assert that the court in Mullane
would have permitted electronic service by the same reasoning it provided for allowing service
by publication; by contrast the judge in Fortunato woodenly clutched to the specific method of
service that had progressively offered then, in light of the time, but today, is woefully behind.
In many ways, the legal field is one that is steeped in tradition and arguably one of the
most resistant to change.lii Even beginning with legal education, there are deep roots and global
traditionalist characteristics of a law school curriculum that evidence how resistant the field is to
reform.liii Undoubtedly there is a ritual function that paper-based service provides which may
increase the solemnity of service so as to impress upon individuals-cum-defendants the
seriousness of the legal actions they are being served with.liv And undoubtedly there are going to
be limitations and set-backs with the implementation of nation-wide electronic service of
process. However, implementation costs of electronic service of process should not deter its
adoption where there is no indication that digitization of communication will fall out of use or is
slowing down. Lag or resistance in adopting electronic service of process constitutes a
derogation of the public interest in having service be effectuated in the most cost-efficient,
timely, and reliable manner. For the policy reasons outlined above and in light of the
functionality and workability demonstrated in both the international sphere, electronic service of
process should be adopted into domestic U.S. law.
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